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THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 1983
I.

INTRODUCTION

An individual who has been injured by a state's violation of a federal
statute may generally advance two distinct causes of action.' First, the private plaintiff may bring suit directly under the statutory provision allegedly
violated. 2 In particular circumstances, however, this option may be either
inappropriate or unavailable. 3 The other option for the private plaintiff is
to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of
action against any person acting under color of state law who has violated
a citizen's rights, privileges or immunities, as secured by the Constitution
4
and laws of the United States.
Whether federal regulations, promulgated by administrative agencies
pursuant to congressional delegation of authority, are privately enforcea1. For a further discussion of the available actions against state actors, see
infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of private causes of action under federal statutes, see infra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992) (finding that section
671(a)(15) of Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 671 (a)(15), did not contain implied right of action for private enforcement);
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (finding no implied private
right of action to enforce Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1738, 1738A); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 21 (1981) (finding no private right of action under either Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342, 1365, 1369 (1994), or
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415
(1994)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) (finding no
private right of action for damages under section 17-a of Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (finding no private right of action to enforce section 206 of
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1, 80b-15). Furthermore, a
plaintiff might bring a cause of action under § 1983 to receive money damages,
which are most likely not available under the federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000) (authorizing actions at law and suits in equity).
4. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983. For a further discussion of the § 1983 cause of action, see infra
Part II.A.

(1139)
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ble under § 1983 remains an unsettled issue in the federal court system. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently considered this issue and concluded that an administrative regulation may only
create an enforceable § 1983 right if the asserted "interest already is implicit in the statute authorizing the regulation." 6 Thus, regulations that
purport to confer rights that Congress has not already created through
statute are not privately enforceable. 7 Regulations that merely interpret
or implement established statutory rights, however, might create privately
enforceable § 1983 interests. 8 Although the Third Circuit has drawn this
distinction between enforceable and unenforceable regulatory interests,
in practice, this boundary is not quite so clear. 9
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit's approach to the availability of a § 1983 cause of action to redress a violation of a federal administrative regulation and its authorizing statute. Part II reviews the § 1983 cause
of action, discusses the concerns related to the private enforcement of federal regulations under § 1983 and analyzes the Third Circuit's recent decision in this area, South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of

5. For a discussion of the United States Supreme CourtJustices' views on this
issue, see infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the lower
federal courts' approaches, see infra note 18 and accompanying text.
6. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
774 (3d Cir. 2001) ("S. Camden III") (finding that regulations at issue did not
create enforceable rights because asserted interest was not already implicit in authorizing statute). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to the private
enforcement of regulations prior to this decision, see infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
7. For examples of these types of regulations, see infra Part III.B.1. Furthermore, there is also the question of whether these regulations are valid in the first
place because by their nature, they confer rights not implicit in the authorizing
statutes. See William Funk, Supreme Court News: Court Holds That There Is No Private
Right of Action for DisparateImpact Discrimination Under Regulations Issued Under Title
VI of 1964 Civil Rights Act, ADMIN. & REGULATORY L. NEWS, Summer 2001, at 14
(doubting whether Court will find disparate-impact regulations valid under Title
VI in light of Court's recent cases analyzing Title VI and interpreting Congress'
power to adopt legislation enforcing Fourteenth Amendment). Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits intentional discrimination by a federally
funded program or activity, expressly authorizes administrative agencies to issue
regulations that implement that objective. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000) (directing agencies to issue implementing regulations). Because certain regulations
issued under that statute prohibit unintentionaldiscrimination, it is questionable
whether these regulations are truly implementing Title VI. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
§§ 7.30, 7.35(b) (2001) (prohibiting conduct with discriminatory effect by programs receiving Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") assistance). The Su-

preme Court has not ruled on this issue, but instead has simply assumed the
validity of these administrative regulations. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.

275, 281 (2001) (assuming, for purposes of deciding case, that disparate-impact
regulations are valid). For a further discussion of Title VI and its disparate-impact
regulations, see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
8. For examples of regulations that should remain enforceable in the Third

Circuit under this approach, see infra Part III.B.2.
9. For a discussion of the characteristics significant to this distinction, see infra Part III.B.
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EnvironmentalProtection.10 Part III outlines the separation of powers concerns relevant to the judicial implication of federal rights and predicts
what types of regulations might create enforceable rights under the South
Camden approach. 11 Finally, Part IV provides the limitations to the § 1983
remedy and evaluates the overall effectiveness of a § 1983 cause of action
12
in these circumstances.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

42 U S.C. § 1983: The Cause of Action

In general, § 1983 provides a remedy to persons deprived of a right,
privilege or immunity "secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United
States. 13 Thus, by its terms, § 1983 explicitly provides a cause of action to
redress violations of federal constitutional rights. 14 Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has established as a general rule that § 1983 also
15
provides a cause of action to redress violations of federal statutory law.
Despite adopting this general rule, a majority of the Court has never expressly held that federal administrative agency regulations alone constitute
"laws" within the meaning of § 1983 and thus may independently create
10. 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). For a further discussion of the background
of § 1983 claims, see infra notes 13-42 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the practical implications of the South Camden
decision, see infra notes 41-121 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the availability and effectiveness of § 1983
causes of action to redress violations of administrative regulations, see infra notes
124-52 and accompanying text.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (emphasis added) (describing methods for
bringing civil actions for deprivation of rights). A valid § 1983 claim requires three
principal elements: (1) the defendant must be a "person"; (2) the defendant must
have been "acting under color of" state law; and (3) the defendant must have deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States. See id. (stating elements). To satisfy the third element, a plaintiff must
assert a violation of a "federal right," not just a violation of federal law. See Blessing
v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (analyzing whether statutory provision created federal right within meaning of § 1983); Golden St. Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (noting that § 1983 "speaks in terms of
'rights, privileges, or immunities,' not violations of federal law"). For a discussion
of two significant limitations to the presumption of an enforceable § 1983 right,
see infra Part W.A.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing private remedy for violation of United
States Constitution). In fact, Justice Powell believed that § 1983 serves as a means
of redress only for violations of fundamental constitutional rights. See Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (contending that
§ 1983 was designed to protect only equal rights legislation). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the PrivateEnforcement of FederalLaw, 49 U. CHi. L. REv. 394,
408-09 (1982) (asserting that Congress intended § 1983 to protect more than just
constitutional rights).
15. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 1 (concluding that § 1983 protects statutory
rights). For the exceptions to this principle, see infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
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privately enforceable rights. 16 On the contrary, four Supreme CourtJustices have maintained that § 1983 rights can never derive from administrative regulations alone.1 7 The circuit courts are similarly split with regards
to the status of regulations under § 1983.18
Congress originally enacted § 1983 as Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 187119 for the express purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 Soon thereafter, Congress amended the statute to
protect rights secured by federal law, in addition to constitutional rights. 21
The marked hesitancy of the current courts toward deciding that § 1983
provides a cause of action to enforce administrative regulations seems to
turn on the interpretation of the term "and laws" within the language of
16. But see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 301 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding clear precedent that administrative regulations are enforceable
under § 1983). Justice Stevens stated, "[1] itigants who in the future wish to enforce
the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only reference
§ 1983 to obtain relief .. " Id. at 300. Other Supreme CourtJustices have also
expressed the view that agency regulations do in fact constitute valid federal law
enforceable under § 1983. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463
U.S. 582, 638 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is clear that the § 1983 remedy
is intended to redress the deprivation of rights secured by all valid federal laws,
including statutes and regulations having the force of law.").
17. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 43738 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting view that valid regulations,
adopted pursuant to statutes that create enforceable rights, may themselves create
enforceable rights without regard to intent of Congress).
18. Compare Harris v.James, 127 F.3d 993, 1005-09 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that valid regulation, in conjunction with statute, may only create enforceable
right if it defines or fleshes out specific statutory right), and Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d
980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987) ("An administrative regulation . . .cannot create an enforceable § 1983 interest not already implicit in the enforcing statute."), with Levin
v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that administrative regulations may create rights, privileges or immunities within meaning of § 1983), and
Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1150 (1995) (asserting that because federal regulations have force of law, they
may independently create rights under § 1983).
19. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000) (also referred to as Ku Klux Klan Act)).
20. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982) (quoting
Lynch v. Household Fin.. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972) (asserting that Congress
intended remedy under Act to be as broad as Fourteenth Amendment protection)). It is also important to note that § 1983 does not alone provide any substantive rights, but instead protects only rights, privileges or immunities conferred
elsewhere. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985) (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (discussing scope of rights protected by § 1983)).
21. See REV. STAT. § 1979 (1874) (providing remedy for violations of rights
secured by United States Constitution and laws); see also Sunstein, supra note 14, at
408-09 (asserting that Congress did intend, through 1874 revisions, to broaden
scope of § 1983's protection to cover laws other than those secured by United
States Constitution). Sunstein emphasized that these revisions to Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act were enacted in the aftermath of the Civil War, when the national
government was attempting to increase the federal government's regulation of
state governments. See id. at 408-09 (discussing scope of § 1983).
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§ 1983.22 Furthermore, although Congress may delegate to federal agencies the authority to issue valid regulations under federal statutes, many
agencies have issued regulations that create-independent and discrete fed23
eral interests unrelated to Congress' underlying statutory objectives.
22. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (viewing Congress' decision
not to include any modifiers to term "and laws" as clear indication that Congress
intended to protect broad range of federal legislation); Todd E. Pettys, The Intended Relationship Between Administrative Regulations and Section 1983's "Laws" 67
GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 51, 53 (1998) (asserting that use of language 'Constitution and
laws" suggests that Congress intended to confine scope of § 1983 to protect only
constitutional and statutory rights, not regulatory interests); Sunstein, supra note
14, at 404-09 (analyzing legislative history of § 1983 and interpreting term, "and
laws," to comprehend all federal law, not merely subset of laws).
23. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2) (2001) (prohibiting recipient of federal
funds from carrying out programs in manner that has effect of discriminating on
basis of race, color or national origin); 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.30, 7.35(b) (2001) (prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination by any federal program receiving EPA
assistance).
Federal anti-discrimination statutes, in conjunction with their accompanying
agency regulations, provide the clearest examples of statute-regulation combinations that purport to create independent federal rights. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(2000) ("Tide IX") (prohibiting gender discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal funds); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) ("Title VI")
(proscribing discrimination by federally funded program or activity on basis of
race, color or national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) ("Title VII") (making it
unlawful for employer to participate in discriminatory employment practices).
Not surprisingly, the current jurisprudence in this area is based on cases involving
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and regulations issued pursuant to that
statute that prohibit disparate-impact discrimination. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001) (considering claim alleging violation of Title VI disparate-impact regulation issued by Department of Justice); S. Camden Citizens in
Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001) (hearing claim
alleging violation of EPA disparate-impact regulation). Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin by any federally
funded program or activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). This section, however,
which also encompasses a private right of action, applies only to instances of intentional discrimination. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280 (stating that it is "beyond dispute" that Title VI proscribes only intentional discrimination).
In section 602 of Title VI, Congress authorized the administrative agencies
that extend assistance to the federal programs to issue rules and regulations that
are consistent with the objectives of section 601. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000)
(delegating lawmaking authority to agencies). Pursuant to this authority, at least
forty federal agencies have adopted regulations prohibiting conduct that has the
effect of discriminating, even in the absence of proof of intent to discriminate. See,
e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b) (2) (2001) (Dep't of Agric.) (prohibiting utilization of"citeria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals
to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect
of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the
program as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin"); 15
C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(2) (2001) (Dep't of Com.) (same); 22 C.F.R. § 209.4(b) (2) (2001)
(Agency for Int'l Dev.) (same); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b) (2) (i) (2001) (Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev.) (same); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2001) (Dep't of Just.) (same); 29
C.F.R. § 31.3(b) (2) (2001) (Dep't of Lab.) (same); 32 C.F.R. § 195.4(b) (2) (2001)
(Dep't of Def.) (same); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2) (2001) (Dep't of Educ.) (same);
45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (2) (2001) (Dep't of Health & Human Servs.) (same); 49 C.F.R.
§ 21.5(b) (2) (2001) (Dep't of Transp.) (same). Despite the abundance of these
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Private Enforcement of Regulations Under § 1983: Title VI and
Its Implementing Regulations

The matter of the private enforceability of administrative regulations
came into the forefront last year after the Supreme Court concluded in
Alexander v. Sandova124 that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not
confer a private right of action to enforce administrative regulations
promulgated pursuant to that statute. 2 5 In Sandoval, the regulations at
issue prohibited a federally funded program or activity from engaging in
conduct that had a discriminatory effect on any group protected by the
statute. 26 Prior.to this decision, the law of most circuits, including the
regulations, a noticeable discrepancy between section 601's ban on intentional discrimination and the section 602 regulations' ban on disparate-impact discrimination did exist and this discrepancy persuaded the United States Supreme Court to
grant certiorari to consider this issue. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293 (finding no
private right of action to enforce regulations).
24. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
25. See Sandova 532 U.S. at 293 (stating holding). In Sandoval, the Court
addressed a challenge to the Alabama Department of Public Safety's official policy
of administering its driver's license examinations in English only. See id. at 278-79
(stating facts). The respondents alleged that this policy violated a Department of
Justice regulation promulgated pursuant to Title VI that prohibited federal funding recipients from utilizing criteria or administrative methods that have the effect
of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on national origin. See id. at 279
(stating facts). The Court first established that section 601 of Title VI does in fact
confer a private right of action. See id. at 279 ("[Pjrivate individuals may sue to
enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and damages."). The
Court then determined, however, that that right of action did not encompass suits
for violations of the section 602 disparate-impact regulations because while section
601 prohibits only intentional discrimination, the regulations go one step further
by prohibiting unintentional discrimination. See id. at 285 (analyzing section 601).
The Court then looked to the text and structure of section 602 and determined
that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under either that
section or the regulations promulgated pursuant to it. See id. at 288-89 (analyzing
text of section 602). Accordingly, the Court held that "[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. We there-

fore hold that no such right of action exists." Id. at 293.
26. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2) (forbidding funding recipients to "utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals
to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin"). Although the
decision precluded private persons from suing under Title VI to redress violations
of the statute's disparate-impact regulations, Title VI explicitly contains an administrative remedy, which charges the administrative agencies that issued the regulations with the obligation to also enforce them. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000)
(providing remedial scheme). Section 602 states that an agency may secure compliance with an implementing regulation by either terminating or refusing to
grant or continue assistance to any recipient as to whom there has been an express
finding of a failure to comply or simply by any other means authorized by law. See
id. (stating requirements for compliance). Furthermore, individuals may be able
to file administrative complaints alleging discriminatory effects in violation of Title
VI regulations; See EPA Office of Civil Rights, Interim Guidancefor InvestigatingTitle
VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (1998) (providing uniform framework for consideration of complaints), at http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/interim.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2002).
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Third Circuit, would have permitted private individuals to enforce the Title VI regulations through a private cause of action. 27 Therefore, many
27. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925,
937 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom., 524 U.S. 974 (1998) (finding Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection violated Title VI discriminatory effects
regulation by issuing permit authorizing operation of waste processing facility in
predominantly black neighborhood). The Court of Appeals stated, "private plaintiffs may maintain an action under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated
by federal administrative agencies pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964." Id. The Third Circuit reinforced this position two years later.
See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397-400 (3d Cir. 1999) (defining Tide VI disparate-impact regulation to provide private right of action). In Powell, the Third Circuit relied on its earlier decision in Chester Residents and held that the Department
of Education regulation prohibiting discriminatory effects in educational programs gave rise to an implied private right of action. See id. (discussing right of
action under regulation).
Most other circuits reached similar conclusions in response to claims alleging
disparate-impact discrimination in violation of Title VI and its implementing regulations. See, e.g., David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988) ("It is clear
that plaintiffs may maintain a private cause of action to enforce the regulations
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Moreover, plaintiffs need not
show intentional discriminatory conduct to prevail on a claim brought under these
administrative regulations. Evidence of a discriminatory effect is sufficient." (citation omitted)); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1202-03 (11th Cir.
1999) (recognizing implied private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI, which permitted individuals to "obtain injunctive or declaratory relief by showing, inter alia, that the challenged action has 'a
disparate impact on groups protected by the statute, even if those actions are not
intentionally discriminatory'" (quoting Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997
F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993))); see also Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486
(10th Cir. 1996) ("[C]ertain regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI prohibit
actions that have a disparate impact on groups protected by the act, even in the
absence of discriminatory intent."); N.Y. Urb. League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d
1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that individuals alleging violations of Title VI
regulations may make prima facie showing that alleged conduct had disparate impact); Elston, 997 F.2d at 1406 ("While Title VI itself, like the Fourteenth Amendment, bars only intentional discrimination, the regulations promulgated pursuant
to Title VI may validly proscribe actions having a disparate impact on groups protected by the statute, even if those actions are not intentionally discriminatory."
(citations omitted)); Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d
1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying disparate-impact analysis to claim predicated on Title VI regulations); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th Cir.
1984) ("[P]roof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish liability when the suit
is brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant to the statute rather than the
statute itself." (footnote omitted)). The federal circuit courts usually applied the
following analysis to claims of disparate-impact discrimination: First, the courts
placed the initial burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case that a
facially neutral practice had resulted in a racial disparity. See Powell, 189 F.3d at 393
(reviewing analysis). If the plaintiff met this burden, the courts then required the
defendant to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the action.
See id. (stating analysis). If the defendant met this rebuttal burden, the courts then
shifted the burden back to the plaintiff to establish either that the defendant overlooked a less discriminatory, but equally effective alternative, or that the proffered
justification was only a pretext for racial discrimination. See id. at 394 (providing
analysis); see also N.Y. Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036 (analyzing burden of proof);
Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 (providing analysis).
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read Sandoval as destroying a major avenue through which private plaintiffs commonly sought relief for injuries caused by unintentional discrimi28
nation by the state.
Soon after Sandoval, however, the United States District Court for the
District of NewJersey endorsed an alternative basis for relief, which would
allow a plaintiff to assert a cause of action under § 1983 to redress a violation of a Title VI disparate-impact regulation. 29 At the time of the district
court's decision, the private enforceability of administrative regulations
under § 1983 was not a generally accepted principle within the federal
court system. 30 Moreover, although the Third Circuit had never explicitly
held that regulations alone might create enforceable § 1983 rights, it had
28. See Stephen Seplow, 'Potentiallyhuge' bias-suit ruling draws closer look, PHILA.
May 10, 2001, at 1 (arguing that Sandoval decision will make it "significantly harder for victims of the most pervasive kinds of discrimination to win court
INQUIRER,

relief"); No Private Right to Enforce Title VI DisparateImpact Regulations, at http://
www.nsclc.org/sandoval.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2002) (discussing potentially
broad implications of Sandoval decision); James Harrington & Charles Wesselhoft,
Ross & Hardies Environmental, Health & Safety Update, Recent Events on the EnvironmentalJusticeFront (June 2001) (asserting that Sandoval decision dealt significant
blow to persons seeking to bring environmental justice actions under Title VI in
federal court), at http://www2.rosshardies.com/publication.cfm?publicationid=
46 (last visited Apr. 6, 2002). Furthermore, courts might apply the Sandoval line of
reasoning to prohibit the enforcement of disparate-impact regulations issued

under other federal statutes, such as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974,

28 U.S.C. § 794, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131, or the Education Amendments of 1972, which bar gender discrimination
in education, (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. § 1681, which all contain remedial provisions
similar to Title VI. SeeJoanna Grossman, The Supreme Court's Recent DisparateImpact
Case and Its Implicationsfor GenderEquity, (May 8, 2001) (predicting impact of Sandoval on claims for disparate-impact discrimination under Title IX), at http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/grossman/20010508.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2002). A Pennsylvania district court, however, decided that Sandoval did not apply to either the
ADA or Section 504 because each of those statutes, unlike Title VI, themselves
prohibit disparate-impact discrimination notwithstanding the language of the regulations. See Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 536-39
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (analyzing impact of Sandoval and finding private right of action
under both statutes to enforce disparate-impact regulations). Nevertheless, a district court in Virginia did extend Sandoval to bar the enforcement of anti-retaliation regulations issued pursuant to Title IX, because those regulations expanded
the scope of discrimination prohibited by that statute. See Litman v. George Mason
Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587 (E.D. Va. 2001) (concluding that Sandoval decision
bars plaintiff's claim for Title IX retaliation).
29. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp.
2d 505, 509 (D.N.J. 2001) ("S. Camden I"), rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001)
(discussing impact of Sandoval decision on that case). The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey issued this decision as a supplement to its first
decision that was decided before Sandoval; defendants subsequently appealed, and
the Third Circuit then reversed. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 791 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing district court's grant of
preliminary injunctive relief).
30. For a further discussion of approaches to the private enforceability of regulations under § 1983, see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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suggested as much. 31 For instance, over a decade ago, the Third Circuit
stated, in dicta, that "valid federal regulations as well as federal statutes
may create rights enforceable under section 1983."32 Recently, the Third
Circuit reached a similar conclusion, deciding that § 1983 suits were not
incompatible with claims alleging violations of Title VI disparate-impact
33
regulations.
C.

The South Camden Decision

Last year, in South Camden, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit strayed from its previous position regarding the private enforcement of federal administrative regulations. 34 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the United States District Court for the District of
NewJersey's decision that a federal regulation could create an enforceable
§ 1983 right even when the alleged interest did not explicitly appear in the
implementing statute.3 5 In South Camden, the plaintiffs alleged that the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's (the "NJDEP") decision to issue a permit to an industrial company allowing it to open a
facility that would emit pollutants constituted disparate-impact discrimina36
tion in violation of regulations enacted by the EPA pursuant to Title VI.
31. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's suggestions, see infra notes
32-33 and accompanying text. Likewise, to determine when a court should imply a
private right of action to enforce an administrative regulation, the Third Circuit
developed a three-prong test which asked "(1) 'whether the agency rule is properly
within the scope of the enabling statute'; (2) 'whether the statute under which the
rule was promulgated properly permits the implication of a private right of action';
and (3) 'whether implying a private right of action will further the purpose of the
enabling statute."' Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988)
(quoting Angelastro v. Prudential Bache-Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir.
1985)).
32. SeeW. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990) (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987)); see also Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250, 260
(3d Cir. 1984) (finding violation of regulation was enforceable under § 1983).
33. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding § 1983 claim
appropriate to redress violation of federal law). In Powell, parents of minority
school students alleged that Pennsylvania's method of funding public education
had a racially discriminatory effect on Philadelphia public school children in violation of a regulation promulgated by the Department of Education pursuant to
Title VI. See id. at 391 (establishing facts).
34. See generally S. Camden Ill, 274 F.3d at 771. (concluding that regulations at
issue did not create private enforceable rights).
35. See id. at 791 (reversing district court).
36. See id. at 774 (stating plaintiff's cause of action); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination by federal programs). The proposed facility
was to be used to grind and process granulated blast furnace slag and would emit
certain pollutants into the air, including mercury, lead, carbon monoxide, and
sulfur oxide. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 450 (D.N.J. 2001) ("S. Camden I") (summarizing facts). The plaintiffs included members of South Camden Citizens in Action ("SCCIA"), a community organization comprised of residents of "Waterfront South," an impoverished
neighborhood located in Camden, New Jersey. See id. at 450-51 (stating facts).
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In a supplemental opinion released after the Supreme Court decided Sandova4 the district court determined that although the plaintiffs could not
bring suit directly under Title VI to enforce the regulations, they could
37
instead assert a claim under § 1983.
The defendants in the case included NJDEP, a state agency responsible for enforcing the federal and state environmental laws and regulations, as well as the Commissioner of NJDEP and St. Lawrence Cement Company. See id. at 450 (discussing
facts). Many industrial facilities are situated in the neighborhood and accordingly,
residents of Waterfront South, ninety-one percent of which are minorities, suffer
from a disproportionately high rate of asthma and other respiratory ailments. See
id. at 451 (summarizing facts). The plaintiffs argued that the operation of the
proposed facility would have an adverse, disparate impact on the residents of the
Waterfront South Community based on the race, color or national origin of its
residents. See id. at 481-82 (stating plaintiffs' claim). The EPA regulations at issue
provided:
No person shall be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving EPA assistance on the basis of race, color, [or] national origin .... A
recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating
or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex.
40 C.F.R. §§ 7.30, 7.35(b) (2001). In its first opinion, the district court held that
the plaintiffs made a prima facie showing under the regulations that the operation
of the facility would have a racially disparate adverse impact on them in violation
of Title VI. See S. Camden 1,145 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (stating conclusions of law). As
a result, the district court granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and vacated the air permits issued by NJDEP. See id. at 505 (granting injunction). Five days after the district court released this opinion, however, the
Supreme Court decided Sandoval. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293
(2001) (holding that disparate-impact regulations cannot be enforced through private cause of action). Because the district court proceeded initially on the assumption that Title VI did create a private right of action to enforce the disparateimpact regulations, Sandoval effectively mooted that decision. See S. Camden I, 145
F. Supp. 2d at 474 (asserting that law of circuit supports private right of action
under section 602).
37. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp.
2d 505, 549 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating conclusion).
The district court stated that the Sandoval holding was limited to the notion that
Title VI does not create an implied private cause of action to enforce regulations
promulgated under section 602 of the Act that prohibit disparate-impact discrimination. See id. at 518 ("The holding in Sandoval is explicitly limited to the determination that § 602 itse/fdoes not create a fight of private action."). Thus, the court
concluded, as a threshold matter, that Sandoval did not preclude the plaintiffs
"from pursuing any cause of action" for disparate-impact discrimination in violation of the EPA's section 602 implementing regulations. See id. at 517 (noting that
any arguments or interpretations to contrary reach far beyond Sandovats narrow
holding). The district court relied heavily on Third Circuit precedent and on application of the three-part analysis to determine if a federal statute confers an enforceable fight. For a discussion of this three-part analysis, see infra notes 128-31
and accompanying text. The court concluded that the EPA's implementing regulations conferred upon the plaintiffs a federal right to be free from disparate-impact discrimination by recipients of federal funds-a right that is enforceable
under § 1983. See S. Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (concluding plaintiffs as-
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The district court's decision presented the question of whether a "federal right" should be enforceable under § 1983, even though it was not
enforceable under the federal statute that provided the right in the first
place.3 8 Following the prevailing trend of the courts in refusing to acknowledge the existence of federal rights without any clear congressional
sanction, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 3 9 In the
heart of its analysis, the court took pains to distinguish the South Camden
facts from other opinions in which courts concluded that administrative
regulations could be enforced through § 1983.40 The Third Circuit reasoned that the regulations at issue in those cases, as opposed to the dispaserted violation of "federal right"). Furthermore, the court held that the regulations did not contain any provisions that demonstrated congressional intent to
foreclose a § 1983 remedy. See id. at 545 '(concluding that limited enforcement
power of EPA to enforce regulations was insufficient to warrant implication of congressional intent to foreclose § 1983 remedy). As a result, the district court concluded that private plaintiffs could enforce disparate-impact regulations,
promulgated pursuant to section 602 of Title VI, under § 1983. See id. at 549 (stating conclusion).
38. See S. Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (finding right to be free from
disparate-impact discrimination enforceable under § 1983, but not under Title
VI). The decision also presented a concern that a proliferation of new litigation
might emerge if interests created by an administrative regulation alone could be
enforced under § 1983. Cf Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 12 (1980) (PowellJ.,
dissenting) (asserting that expanding scope of § 1983 to include deprivation of
statutory fights in addition to constitutional rights would "dramatically expand the
liability of state and local officials"). Furthermore, because § 1983 only provides a
remedy when a state actor deprives an individual of a federal right, these persons
could bear the burden ofjoint state and federal discrimination. See id. at 22 (Powell, J., dissenting) (analyzing scope of § 1983).
39. See S. Camden III, 274 F.3d at 774 (holding that disparate-impact regulation did not create enforceable § 1983 right).
40. See id. at 782-85 (analyzing relevant case law). The court first distinguished Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
See id. at 782 (explaining that issue in Wright was different than issue in South Camden). In Wright, the plaintiffs alleged that the housing authority violated a federal
statute imposing a rent ceiling as well as regulations implementing that statute.' See
Wright, 479 U.S. at 419 (presenting claim). The Supreme Court held that the statute and its implementing regulations created an enforceable § 1983 right. See id.
at 432 (finding valid cause of action under § 1983). In South Camden, the Third
Circuit explained that "the regulation at issue in Wright merely defined the specific
right that Congress already had conferred through the statute." S. Camden I1, 274
F.3d at 783. In contrast, the regulations at issue in South Camden purported to
create the right to be free from disparate-impact discrimination, a right that was
not implicit in the authorizing statute. See id. (explaining teachings of Wright to
deal with regulations at issue). The Court of Appeals then distinguished what appeared to be the controlling circuit precedent. See id. at 784-85 (analyzing relevant
Third Circuit cases).
In Powell v. Ridge, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs could use § 1983 to
redress an alleged violation of Title VI and Title VI regulations promulgated by the
Department of Education. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 1999)
(allowing § 1983 claim for violation of regulation). The South Camden court asserted, however, that Powell did not squarely confront the current issue regarding
whether a regulation in itself, independent from the governing statute, could create a right enforceable under § 1983. See S. Camden III, 274 F.3d at 784 (asserting
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rate-impact regulations at issue in South Camden, created interests that
were already provided in the enforcing statutes. 41 As a result, the Third
Circuit concluded that:
an administrative regulation cannot create an interest enforceable under section 1983 unless the interest already is implicit in
the statute authorizing the regulation, and that inasmuch as Title
VI proscribes only intentional discrimination, the plaintiffs do
not have a right enforceable through a 1983 action under the
42
EPA's disparate impact discrimination regulations.

III.

THE CREATION OF ENFORCEABLE FEDERAL RIGHTS

In the United States Constitution, the Framers articulated the precise
powers of the judicial and legislative branches of government. 4 3 Various
constitutional provisions expressly grant Congress the power to enact federal legislation. 44 Similarly, the Constitution provides that the judiciary
shall adjudicate individuals' claims challenging the validity of a law or requesting redress because of a violation of a federal right conferred by a
that Powell court simply assumed that regulations could create enforceable § 1983
rights, but did not analyze that issue).
41. See S. Camden III, 274 F.3d at 783 (explaining that Wright Court located
alleged right in statutory provision and relied upon implementing regulation to
define and interpret that right).
42. Id. at 774; cf Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1009 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating
that "if the regulation goes beyond explicating the specific content of the statutory
provision and imposes distinct obligations in order to further the broad objectives
underlying the statutory provision, . . .the regulation is too far removed from
Congressional intent to constitute a 'federal right' enforceable under § 1983").
Dissenting in South Camden III,Judge McKee argued that the enforcement of the
disparate-impact regulations under § 1983 comported with the controlling law of
the Third Circuit as well as the Supreme Court precedent. See S. Camden 11, 274
F.3d at 791-98 (McKee, J., dissenting) (reviewing decisions). Judge McKee stated
that Powell controlled the dispute because the Court of Appeals was considering
precisely the same issue in both cases. See id. at 791 (McKee,J., dissenting) (finding Powell controlling). Furthermore, Judge McKee argued that Wright is consistent with the proposition that regulations themselves may create enforceable
federal rights. See id. at 797-98 (asserting that Supreme Court precedent provides
additional support for plaintiffs' claim).
43. See U.S. CONST. arts. 1,111 (setting forth powers of legislative and judicial
branches). For a discussion of these powers, see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
44. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5 (providing Congress with power to enforce provisions of Fourteenth Amendment through appropriate legislation); U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress to regulate commerce among states
and with foreign countries); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commanding Congress to
provide for general welfare of United States). Congress enacted Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which conditions the receipt of federal funds on the absence of discrimination by a federally funded agency, pursuant to this spending
power. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-d-7 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on
race, color or national origin).
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law. 4 5 The power of the federal judiciary is provided in Article III, which
explicitly vests federal jurisdiction in one Supreme Court, and those lower
federal courts that Congress, in its sole discretion, may establish. 46 In addition, while Article III sets the precise limits of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, it gives Congress the power to make exceptions to the
47
stated categories of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
A.

Expansion of Rights Jurisprudence

Although the legislative and judicial branches retain discrete authority over certain specified governmental functions, the roles of both
branches frequently overlap in practice. 48 For instance, Congress often
sets forth rules and regulations in legislation, but fails to set forth the remedies available to private individuals if these rules and regulations are not
followed. 49 In these situations, the judiciary may be placed in a position to
potentially create or expand federal rights, although the Constitution explicitly vests such law-making authority in Congress. 50 As a result, federal
courts are extremely hesitant to imply private causes of action or to infer
private remedies outside of the statute in question if it is not readily apparent that Congress intended to do so. 5 1 The pervasiveness of this principle
45. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 (vesting judicial power in federal courts
and establishing scope of federal jurisdiction). The Supreme Court also has the
power to declare federal statutes unconstitutional. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
46. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing federal judicial power). Furthermore, it seems that because Article III directs Congress to create lower federal
courts, the Framers also intended to give Congress the power to determine the
scope of the jurisdiction of these lower federal courts. See Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) (arguing that Congress is obligated to
vest all judicial power, either in original or appellate form, in some federal court);
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850) (deciding that because Congress has power to establish lower courts, it also has power to define respective
jurisdictions).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 (providing Congress' power to designate
exceptions); see also Ex. parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-15 (1868) (validating Congress' decision to repeal provision of Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized Supreme Court to hear appeals from decisions of lower courts in habeas
corpus cases); Leonard G. Ratner, MajoritarianConstraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme CourtJurisdiction,27 VILL. L. REv. 929, 939 (1982) (contending that exceptions clause allows Congress to make only those exceptions that
will not interfere with essential functions of Supreme Court).
48. For a further discussion of the overlap in powers, see infra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-d(7) (2000) (providing no private remedy in
text of statute).
50. For a further discussion of the separation of powers concerns raised in
these situations, see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
51. See generally Richard W. Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implications of Implied Rights of Action, 34 MERCER L. REv. 973 (1983) (analyzing Supreme Court's
focus on congressional intent to create causes of action in relation to separation of
powers doctrine); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programsand Private
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is manifest in the reasoning and implications of the Third Circuit's deci52

sion in South Camden.

A court has the potential to expand federal rights in two principle
areas: (1) the implication of a private right of action under a federal statute, and (2) the determination that a federal law creates a right enforceable under § 1983. 53 Until the past decade, the Supreme Court was willing
to imply a private right of action under a federal statute if Congress had
not explicitly denied the right and if allowing private suits would further
the statute's purpose. 54 Presently, the Supreme Court is more hesitant to
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193 (1982) (discussing separation of powers issues involved in judicial implication of private rights of action). But see Linda Sheryl
Greene, JudicialImplication of Remediesfor FederalStatutory Violations: The Separationof
Powers Concerns, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 469 (1980) (arguing that separation of powers is
not violated by judicial creation of remedies for violations of federal rights).
52. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
790 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating
The Supreme Court's primary concern in considering enforceability of
federal claims under section 1983 has been to ensure that Congress intended to create the federal right being advanced. Accordingly, we hold
that a federal regulation alone may not create a right enforceable
through section 1983 not already found in the enforcing statute. Similarly, we reject the argument that enforceable rights may be found in any
valid administrative implementation of a statute that in itself creates some
enforceable right)
(citations omitted). After applying these principles, the Third Circuit concluded
that Congress did not intend to create a right to be free from disparate-impact
discrimination through the adoption of Title VI, and therefore, regulations that
prohibited this conduct did not create enforceable rights under § 1983. See id. at
791 (reversing district court order granting injunctive relief to plaintiffs).
53. Compare Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (articulating four-factor test to
determine if statute contains implied cause of action), with Blessing v. Freestone,
520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (setting forth three-part analysis to determine if statute confers federally enforceable right). Although in many respects the analyses
are similar, in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must only establish that Congress intended to create a privately enforceable federal right in favor of the plaintiff. See
W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18-19 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing
relevant inquiries to determine if right of action exists under § 1983). A plaintiff
asserting a claim directly under a federal statute, however, must not only show that
Congress intended to create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff, but also that
Congress intended the right to encompass a private remedy through a cause of
action under the statute. See id. at 19 (reviewing factors to establish implied right
of action under federal statutes).
54. SeeJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (noting that private
cause of action exists under § 27 to bring suit for violation of § 14(a) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934). In the decades following Borak, most federal courts used a
four-factor analysis as the general framework to determine whether a statute created an implied right of action. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 302 (2d Cir.
1980) (following Cort analysis and concluding that private cause of action existed
under Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7(d), 7a(8), 13(b)); Redington v.
Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 621 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying Cort analysis to
imply cause of action under section 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a)); Lloyd v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (7th Cir.
1977) (using Cort analysis and implying cause of action under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The Supreme Court set forth this test as follows:
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imply private rights of action unless Congress' intent to do so is manifest
either in the language or structure of the statute or in the circumstances
surrounding its enactment. 55 Additionally, the Supreme Court has made
clear that rights conferred by administrative regulations alone can never
be enforced through a private cause of action. 5 6 Nevertheless, the Court
has suggested that regulations that define or interpret statutory provisions
may be enforced through the underlying statute's cause of action, if that
right so exists.

57

(1) Is the plaintiff of the class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted?
(2) Is there any indication of congressional intent to provide (or deny) a
remedy?
(3) Is the implication of a remedy consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme?
(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based on federal
law?
See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (providing four-factor inquiry). The problem with this test,
however, was that only one of the four factors involved an analysis of congressional
intent to create the right, while the rest involved 'Judicial lawmaking." See Cannon
v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 740 (1979) (Powell,J., dissenting) (stating that fourpart Cort analysis "too easily may be used to deflect inquiry away from the intent of
Congress, and to permit a court instead to substitute its own views as to the desirability of private enforcement"). Justice Powell argued that Congress alone should
have the authority to establish a private cause of action, and when Congress has
not explicitly done so, the judiciary should not imply the existence of the right
without compelling evidence to do so. See id. at 730-31 (discussing appropriate test
to determine when Court should imply ight of action to enforce federal statute).
55. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)
(asserting that congressional intent is ultimate issue in implication of private fight
of action); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (finding no
congressional intent to create private right of action to enforce Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) (finding no congressional intent to create private right of
action for damages under section 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a)); Transamerica Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24
(1979) (finding no congressional intent to create private right of action to enforce
section 201 of Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1, 80b-15). Although recognizing the viability of the four-part Cort analysis, the Supreme Court
in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, spoke of the "concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of
remedies for violations of statutes." Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 509
n.9 (1990).
56. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) (stating that
"[1]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress
through statutory text created, but it may not create a fight that Congress has
not").
57. See id. at 284 (asserting that if Congress intended federal statute to be
enforced through private cause of action, it also intended authoritative interpretation of statute to be so enforced). The Court recognized that regulations that
"authoritatively construe" Title VI, such as regulations that prohibit intentional
discrimination, will remain enforceable through section 601's private cause of action. See id. (discussing enforcement of Title VI disparate-impact regulations).
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The second area in which this issue arises is the judicial approval of a
private remedy for violation of a federal right under § 1983.58 Although
the text of § 1983 expressly grants a private right of action, courts faced
with these claims must also discern whether Congress intended for the
asserted right to be privately enforceable under § 1983. 59 Without an unmistakable mandate from Congress that it intended to create a federally
enforceable right, the courts will not infer this intent by permitting the
plaintiff to seek relief under § 1983.60
Most significant to the matter at hand is the application of these prin61
ciples to the private enforceability of federal regulations under § 1983.
With congressional intent as the determinative factor in a § 1983 analysis,
it is arguable whether regulations, promulgated by administrative agencies
(and not Congress itself), should be able to create federal rights worthy of
private § 1983 remedies. 62 This inconsistency also troubled the Third Cir58. For a discussion of the § 1983 cause of action, see supra Part II.A.
59. For a further discussion of the judicial implication of congressional intent
to create an enforceable § 1983 right, see infra notes 124-41 and accompanying
text. Because the.implication of a private cause of action requires a court to infer
Congress' intent to create or deny a right of action, while § 1983 explicitly confers
such a right, courts may be slightly less hesitant to imply an enforceable § 1983
right than to imply a private right of action under a federal statute. See Wilder, 496
U.S. at 509, n.9 (noting that Congress has expressly authorized private suits under
§ 1983); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 19 (1981) (referring to § 1983 as "alternative source of express congressional
authorization of private suits"); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 19
n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (asserting that § 1983 remedy is presumed once existence of
federal right is established); Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI's
Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 321, 323 (2001), (arguing that courts
should recognize § 1983 as valid cause of action to enforce regulations because
these suits do not raise same separation of powers concerns as do implied causes of
action under regulations themselves).
60. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) (considering whether
"Congress, in enacting the Adoption Act, unambiguously confer[red] upon the
child beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce the requirement that the State
make 'reasonable efforts' to prevent a child from being removed from his home");
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 (addressing whether Congress intended statutory provision
to benefit plaintiffs and thus confer "federal right"); Golden St. Transit Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 111 (1989) (looking to language, history and

structure of National Labor Relations Act to determine whether statute created
certain labor and management rights against governmental interference); Wright
v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430 (1987) (analyzing text of statutory provisions to determine whether Congress intended to create "enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983");
S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. 274 F.3d 771, 784 (3d Cir.
2001) ("[T]he Supreme Court refined its analysis to focus directly on Congress'
intent to create enforceable rights and to confine its holdings to the limits of that
intent.").
61. For a discussion of the potential enforceability of regulations in a § 1983
action under the South Camden approach, see infra Part III.B.
62. See S. Camden J1I, 274 F.3d at 790 (" [l]f there is to be a private enforceable
right under Title VI to be free from disparate impact discrimination, Congress,
and not an administrative agency or a court, must create this right."). But see
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1979) (deciding whether agency
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cuit in South Camden, which led to its conclusion that if an administrative
agency is purporting to confer a right through a rule or regulation, that
right must already be implicit in an existing statute to be enforceable
under § 1983.63 In other words, only Congress itself may create federal
rights, but if a regulation does nothing more than interpret that right, the
combined statutory-regulatory interest may be enforceable under

§

1983.64

B.

Beginning the South Camden Era: What Regulations Represent Valid
Administrative Interpretations?

Viewed against this backdrop, the South Camden decision and the reasoning behind it surely encompass a broad section of federal regulations
and their enforcing statutes. 6 5 Unmistakable in its concern over invading
a traditional sphere of congressional power, the Third Circuit decisively
concluded that an administrative regulation alone can never create a right
enforceable under § 1983; but instead, may only be enforced if the asserted right is coupled with a guarantee implicit in the enforcing federal
statute. 66 Accordingly, plaintiffs who wish to enforce federal regulations
under § 1983 in the Third Circuit should argue that the asserted right is
merely defining or fleshing out an established statutory right. 67 The easiest way to determine the types of regulations this definition will encompass
68
is to parse through various examples of regulation-statute combinations.
1. Regulations that Create Independent Interests
The clearest examples of regulations that will be categorically unenforceable in the Third Circuit following South Camden are Title VI disparegulations may be regarded as "law" within meaning of Trade Secrets Act, 18

U.S.C. § 1905). The Court maintained that "properly promulgated" federal
agency regulations might have "the force and effect of law" if they are "substantive"
or "legislative-type" rules that affect individual rights and obligations and have
been validly promulgated pursuant to a congressional grant of legislative authority,

in conformity with any procedural requirements imposed by Congress. See Brown,
441 U.S. at 294-98 (considering circumstances in which administrative regulations
may have force and effect of law).
63. See S. Camden III, 274 F.3d at 774 (stating holding). For a further discussion of the South Camden lldecision, see supra notes 3842 and accompanying text.
64. For examples of regulations that interpret federal statutory rights, see infra Part III.B.2.
65. See S. Camden III, 274 F.3d at 774 (asserting that regulations can never
independently create enforceable federal rights). The broad language used by the
Third Circuit in South Camden suggests that the court did not intend to limit the
holding to apply only to Title VI disparate-impact regulations. For a further discussion of the decision, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
66. For the holding of the South Camden decision, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
67. For examples of regulations that should satisfy this definition, see infra
Part III.B.2.
68. For a discussion of these examples, see infra Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2.
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rate-impact regulations. 69 The South Camden decision established that
these regulations advance a right that is not implicit in the authorizing
statute.7 0 It is indisputable that Title VI itself prohibits only intentional
71
discrimination, as established by a wealth of Supreme Court decisions.
The disparate-impact regulations do not merely interpret or define this
right, but instead attempt to create a wholly new right-the right to be
free from unintentional discrimination. 72 Thus, so long as the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Title VI rejects a prohibition on unintentional
discrimination, the Title VI regulations that proscribe such conduct will be
7
unenforceable under both the statute itself and § 1983. 3
Similar to Title VI, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
prohibits an educational institution receiving federal funding to discriminate with respect to gender.7 4 Pursuant to this statute, the Department of
Education has issued various regulations, one of which prohibits a federal
funding recipient from retaliating against a person for filing a complaint
of gender discrimination in violation of Title IX. 75 Title IX itself does not
include a similar anti-retaliation provision. 76 Therefore, to determine
69. See S. Camden III, 274 F.3d at 771, 774 (holding that plaintiffs did not have
right enforceable through § 1983 action under EPA's disparate-impact discrimination regulations).
70. See id. at 789-90 (explaining that regulations are not based on any federal
right present in statute). But see id. at 798 (McKee, J., dissenting) (arguing that
disparate-impact regulations may be traced to Title VI and "may very well reflect an
agency's practical considerations and definition of discrimination").
71. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (asserting that it is
agreed that § 601 of Title VI proscribes only intentional discrimination); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) ("Title VI itself directly reach[es] only
instances of intentional discrimination."); Guardians Ass'n v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 610 (1983) (PowellJ., concurring) (asserting that Title VI only
prohibits intentional discrimination); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 287 (1978) (stating that Title VI proscribes only racial classifications that
would violate Equal Protection Clause or Fifth Amendment); see also Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (adhering to "basic equal protection principle that
the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose").
72. For a further discussion of these regulations, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
73. See Edward Lazarus, The Case That Roared:A Limited "Disparate-Impact"Holding That Could Have Large Repercussions, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
lazarus/20010501.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2002) (questioning agenda of current
conservative Supreme Court to eliminate claims for disparate-impact discrimination). Lazarus asserts that while conservatives, including a majority of the present
Justices, would focus exclusively on whether rules or policies reflect discriminatory
intent, liberals would argue that disparate-impact discrimination provides a useful
tool for uncovering such discriminatory intent, which is often impossible to prove.
See id. (discussing pros and cons of disparate-impact litigation).
74. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000) ("Title IX") (prohibiting discrimination
based on gender in education).
75. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2001) (barring retaliation).
76. But cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2001) ("Title VII") (barring retaliation by
employer against employee alleging discriminatory employment practices).
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whether the anti-retaliation regulations are enforceable under the South
Camden approach, a court must first determine whether Title IX's defini77
tion of discrimination implicitly embraces a prohibition on retaliation.
If so, the regulation would merely be interpreting the statute instead of
expanding its scope. 78 It is more likely, however, that a court would view
the regulation as creating a completely new right because the harm that
the anti-retaliation regulation addresses is not a direct consequence of the
initial discrimination, but occurs only when a victim of discrimination responds to that discrimination by complaining about it. 79 Therefore, it is
unlikely that Congress impliedly included the right to be free from retalia80
tion in its definition of discrimination under Title IX.
Other types of regulations that should not constitute valid administrative interpretations under the South Camden approach are those regulations that do not impose mandatory requirements on states, but instead
provide guidance or suggest procedures intended to further the stated
goals of the relevant statutory provisions. 8 1 For instance, Title XIX of the
Social Security Act of 1965 gives states the option of participating in Medicaid, a program through which the participating states.agree to bear some
of the medical expenses of poor citizens within the state. 82 In return, the
77. See Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 583-85 (E.D. Va.
2001) (considering whether Title IX proscribes retaliation).
78. See id. (comparing Title VII anti-retaliation provisions found in statute
itself).
79. See id. (interpreting discrimination under Title IX).
80. See id. at 584-85 (refusing to acknowledge right of action for retaliation
under Title IX). Thus, to find that a Title IX anti-retaliation regulation confers an
enforceable § 1983 right, a court would have to interpret "discrimination" under
the statute to include retaliation. See id. at 583-85 (rejecting argument that harm
from retaliation is prohibited by Title IX's text). Similarly, to find that a Title VI
disparate-impact regulation confers an enforceable § 1983 right, a court would
have to interpret "discrimination" under Title VI to include disparate-impact discrimination. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (stating that it is
undisputable that § 601 of Title VI proscribes only intentional discrimination).
Because the Supreme Court has not done so, and it does not seem likely that it will
do so soon, these regulations will be categorically unenforceable in the Third Circuit under the South Camden approach. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J.
Dep't of Envt Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that right conferred
by regulation must be implicit in authorizing statute to be enforceable).
81. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (2001) (compelling states to provide some sort
of non-emergency transportation to and from patients' medical care providers).
In Harrisv. James, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that these types of regulations are
not enforceable under § 1983 because although they may further the "broad
objectives underlying each statutory provision," they do not define the "content" of
these statutory rights. See Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1011 (lth Cir. 1997)
(discussing validity of regulations). Thus, although these regulations may be valid
because they provide a "means of ensuring" compliance with the statutory right,
the link between the regulatory interest and congressional intent to create a comparable federal statutory right is insufficient. See id. at 1012 (finding plaintiffs did
not have federal right enforceable under § 1983).
82. See42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994) (governing Medicaid program); see also Silver
v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1986) (describing Medicaid program).
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federal government subsidizes a portion of these financial obligations.8 3 A
particular regulation issued under Tide XIX requires participating states
to specify in their Medicaid plans that the Medicaid agency will provide
some sort of non-emergency transportation to and from patients' medical
care providers. 84 For this regulation to be enforceable under the South
Camden approach, a court must interpret Title XIX to require participating states to provide this transportation service as part of its Medicaid
86
If
plans.8 5 If so, the regulation would only be defining a statutory right.

not, the regulation would be attempting to confer a federal interest not
87
implicit in the statute.
On the one hand, Congress clearly intended Title XIX to confer a
benefit to Medicaid recipients by ensuring that their medical needs were
provided for under the program. 8 8 Accordingly, a court might construe
the regulation as delineating the specific contours of the statutory right by
requiring access to transportation. 89 On the other hand, a court might
find conclusive the fact that Title XIX does not mention a transportation
requirement.9 0 For example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
nexus between the regulation and the congressional intent to create a
comparable federal right was too tenuous to infer an enforceable right to
transportation. 91 Nevertheless, for the reasons expressed above, a court
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (setting forth Medicaid program); see also Silver, 804
F.2d at 1215 (describing Medicaid program).
84. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (requiring states to establish transportation
procedures).

85. Cf Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding
that transportation regulation is enforceable under § 1983).
86. Cf id. (relying on Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority to support private enforcement of right).

87. Cf Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1010-11 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that transportation regulation does not define any rights already conferred by
Congress).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2000) (setting out requirements in State plans
for medical assistance).
89. Cf Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that administrative regulations at issue defined contours of statutory right to reasonably
prompt provision of medical assistance under Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (8)).
90. Cf Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009-12 (finding no federal right to transportation
in text of specific statutory sections).
91. See id. (comparing transportation regulation to specific statutory provisions); cf Kissimmee River Valley Sportsman Ass'n v. City of Lakeland, 250 F.3d
1324, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting claim that Federal Aid in Sportfish Recreation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 771a-777k, in conjunction with implementing regulations,
created federal right of equal access for boats with common horsepower ratings).
Relying on its decision in Harris, the Eleventh Circuit in Kissimmee River Valley
found an insufficient nexus between the regulations at issue and any federal right
implicit in the authorizing statute. See Kissimmee River Valley, 250 F.3d at 1327
(quoting Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009) (finding regulation to impose "new and 'distinct
obligations' not found in the statute itself, and thus [wa]s 'too far removed from
the Congressional intent to constitute a 'federal right' enforceable under
§ 1983'").
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could rationally view the regulation as a valid interpretation of Title
XIX. 92

In a similar case, the Sixth Circuit heard a claim under the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which requires states to promptly
investigate reports of abuse and neglect and to implement procedures,
personnel and facilities to effectively address the confirmed cases. 93 Regulations promulgated under that statute offer numerous suggestions as to
what the investigations might include and what the emergency services
might entail. 94 On the one hand, these regulations may to some extent
flesh out the general statutory requirements. 95 On the other hand, these
regulations do not speak in either specific or mandatory terms, and thus
may not sufficiently define orimplement the authorizing federal statute to
create enforceable rights. 96 As a result of this ambiguity, it is not readily
apparent how the Third Circuit would view these regulations under the
97
South Camden approach.
2.

Regulations that Validly Interpret Federal Statutes
An example of a regulation that does not create an independent

right, but merely defines a statutory right is found in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment Center.98 In Wright, the United States Supreme Court

addressed a claim that the housing authority violated both a federal statute that imposed a rent ceiling and the statute's implementing regulations
that required public housing authorities to include a reasonable utility allowance in the tenants' rent.9 9 The Court referred to the regulation as a
"valid interpretation of the statute" because it merely "defin[ed] the statutory concept of 'rent' as including utilities." 1°0
( Thus, regulations such as
92. Cf Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 189 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
regulations at issue in, Kissimmee River Valley confers enforceable § 1983 right to
access waterways for use of personal watercraft with common horsepower ratings).
In Buckley, the Ninth Circuit decided that the regulation's language should be read
to require the facility and waterway in question to comply with the requirements of
the statute. See id. at 193 (concluding that Congress intended boating facilities to
comply with regulation's requirements).
93. See Tony L. ex. rel. Simpson v. Childers, II, 71 F.3d 1182, 1189 (6th Cir.
1995) (stating bases for plaintiffs' claims); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106h (1994)
(setting forth procedures to address claims of abuse and neglect).
94. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.14(d), (f) (2001) (offering procedures).
95. See Childers, 71 F.3d at 1189 (suggesting that implementing regulations are
clearly intended to provide guidance to states when initiating investigation and
emergency services).
96. See id. (noting that because regulations use word "may," states are not required to rely on examples of procedures provided).
97. See id. (abiding by reasoning of South Camden and concluding that regulations at issue did not create enforceable rights because neither statute nor regulations imposed binding obligations on states).
98. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
99. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 419 (establishing facts of case).
100. See id. at 431 (concluding that regulation conferred enforceable rights
under § 1983).
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these, that do not create discrete federal interests, but instead only delineate the specifics of established statutory rights, clearly comport with the

South Camden approach.101
A related type of administrative regulation requires states to implement certain procedures to secure compliance with a corresponding federal statutory right. 10 2 The Third Circuit addressed this type of claim in
Farley v. PhiladelphiaHousingAuthority,' 0 3 which involved a federal housing
statute and its implementing regulations. 10 4 The United States Housing
Act authorizes the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
provide grants, low interest loans and tax exemptions to local public housing agencies.' 0 5 One particular section of the Act requires the public
agencies to implement an administrative grievance procedure for resolving tenant disputes. 10 6 Certain regulations issued under that provision require the grievance awards to be binding on local housing authorities and
obliges the housing authorities to take all steps necessary to carry out the
judgments.' 0 7 In Farley, the Third Circuit determined that this regulation
clearly implemented the federal statute. 10 8 The terms of the statutory provision exhibit Congress' intent to grant tenants the right to a grievance
101. Cf Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding federal
regulations promulgated pursuant to Title XIX to "further define the contours of
the statutory right to reasonably prompt provision of assistance"). The regulations
at issue in Chiles imposed unambiguous obligations on state agencies to promptly
furnish Medicaid to all eligible recipients without undue delay and also set forth
acceptable time limits in which eligibility determinations should be made. See 42
C.F.R. §§ 435.930(a)-(b), 435.911(a), (e)(1) (2001) (setting forth Medicaid requirements). Similarly, the relevant statutory provision ensured that all individuals
who apply for medical assistance under Medicaid would receive such assistance
with "reasonable promptness." See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (8) (2000) (stating requirement); Chiles, 136 F.3d at 714 (explaining text of statute). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the statutory provision, as further fleshed out by the
regulations, created a federal right to reasonably prompt medical assistance that
was enforceable under § 1983. See id. at 717, 719 (discussing enforceability of asserted right to assistance without unreasonable delay)..
102. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 246.24(a), (b) (2001) (requiring notice and fair
hearing before termination of benefits granted under Supplemental Nutrition
Program for Women, Infants and Children); 24 C.F.R. § 966.57(b) (2001) (requiring local public housing authorities to take all steps necessary to carry out binding
grievance awards).
103. 102 F.3d 697 (3d Cir. 1996).
104. See Farley v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 102 F.3d 697, 697-98 (3d Cir. 1996) (allowing plaintiff to bring cause of action under § 1983 to enforce federal right to
grievance procedure).
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437-1437aaa-8 (2000) (providing grants to public housing authorities).
106. See id. at § 1437d(k) (setting forth procedures for resolutions of tenant
disputes).
107. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.57(b) (compelling agencies to follow through with
grievance awards).
108. SeeFarley, 102 F.3d at 699 (stating that cause of action arises strictly under
statute because regulation is merely interpreting it).
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procedure for complaints. 10 9 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
administrative regulations flesh out this right by ensuring that the housing
10
authorities comply with the results of the grievance procedure."
In 1984, the Third Circuit faced a related challenge by a class of fouryear-old children against the City of Philadelphia concerning its adminisUnder the Supplemental
tration of a federal grant-in-aid program."'
Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children ("WIC"), the federal
government provided cash grants to states that established a system to provide food to women and children faced with the risk of malnutrition.12
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the city violated "fair-hearing"
regulations issued under the WIC program when it terminated the children's benefits without first informing them of their right to a fair hearing. 113 As the South Camden court explained, the right to a fair hearing
upon the termination of benefits could certainly "be traced to and was
consistent with" the statutory right to supplemental food to those who
i1 4
qualified under the statute.
Another category of federal regulations that should constitute valid
administrative interpretations under the South Camden approach are regulations that invalidate any state laws that contradict the provisions of the
authorizing federal statutes. 115 For instance, the Cable Communications
Act of 1984 was designed to "promote the growth of satellite programming
6
and to facilitate individual reception of unencrypted satellite signals.""1
In an amendment to the Act, Congress specifically authorized private persons to install antennas to receive unscrambled satellite programming for
private viewing. 117 In response, the FCC issued a regulation that preempted local ordinances that interfered with this right.' 18 This regulation
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (setting forth grievance/arbitration procedure
that public housing authorities must follow and rights to which tenants are
entitled).
110. Cf Farley, 102 F.3d at 704 (concluding that public housing tenants could
enforce federal right to enforceable grievance procedure under § 1983).
111. See Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250, 261, 265 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that city violated fair hearing regulations by failing to give recipients notice of termination of benefits and right to fair hearing).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (2000) (governing supplemental food program).
113. See Polk, 750 F.2d at 252 (explaining plaintiffs' claim); 7 C.F.R.
§§ 246.24(a), (b) (1978) (ensuring recipients received notice and fair hearing).
114. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d
771, 783 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing Polk decision and concluding that fair-hearing
regulation, in conjunction with authorizing statute, created interest enforceable
under § 1983).
115. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (2001) (preempting all local ordinances that
conflicted with authorizing federal statute).
116. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2000) (providing for adequate receipt of satellite
signals); Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 130
CONG. REc. S14285 (1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4738, 4745 (establishing facts of case)).
117. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(b) (ensuring private persons received benefit of Act).
118. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (preempting conflicting local ordinances).
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is a valid implementation of the statutory right.' 9 Through the enactment of the statute and the related amendment, Congress intended to
provide individuals with the right to receive authorized television signals. 120 By preempting local ordinances that interfered with this interest,
the regulation did nothing more than carry out Congress' original
12
intent. '
These examples demonstrate types of federal administrative regulations that comport with the South Camden formulation of enforceable regulatory rights. 122 This approach requires the nexus between the regulatory
right and the statutory right to be strong enough to impute congressional
approval of the enforceability of the combined interest under § 1983.123
IV.

A.

THE LIMITATIONS TO THE

§ 1983 CAUSE

OF ACTION

Two Exceptions to the Presumption of Enforceability

Determining that an agency regulation is a valid administrative interpretation of a federal statute means only that the regulatory interest, in
conjunction with the statutory interest, may create a federal right enforceable under § 1983.124 A court must also determine whether Congress intended the asserted right to encompass a private remedy within the
purview of § 1983.125 In effect, the asserted interest constitutes a statutory
119. Cf Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 553 (asserting that FCC adopted regulation to
further goals of statute).
120. See id. (emphasizing that Congress intended to promote individual access to satellite programming).
121. Cf id. (concluding that plaintiffs were entitled to bring § 1983 action to
enforce federal right created by regulation in conjunction with statute).

122. For a further discussion of these examples, see supra notes 98-121 and
accompanying text.
123. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of'Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d

771, 790 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that Supreme Court's primary concern in ruling
upon enforceability of rights under § 1983 has been to determine Congress' intent). The requirement of a common interest between the authorizing statute and
the regulation indicates that the prevalent analysis used to determine whether a
statute creates an enforceable § 1983 right is not appropriate when determining
whether a regulation itself creates a § 1983 right. See id. at 781 (stating that district
court erred in applying rights test to EPA regulations). Before South Camden however, Third Circuit courts typically scrutinized only the regulations at issue to determine if they alone created enforceable § 1983 rights. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying rights test to regulation and
noting that "valid federal regulations as well as federal statutes may create rights
enforceable under section 1985') (emphasis added); Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d
250, 259-61 (3d Cir. 1984) (analyzing only regulation and concluding that violation of it was actionable under § 1983). For a discussion of the three-part rights
analysis used to determine if a statute creates an enforceable § 1983 right, see infra
notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
124. See Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008-09 (11th Cir. 1997) (interpreting
enforceability of administrative regulations).
125. See Harris,127 F.3d at 1009 (finding that regulations that define statutory
provisions, which themselves do not create federal rights under three-prong test,
are "too far removed from congressional intent to constitute a 'federal right' en-
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right, which is presumptively enforceable under § 1983.126 This rule, however, is subject to two significant limitations. 12 7 First, a § 1983 remedy is
not available "where the statute d[oes] not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983."128 Second, a § 1983
remedy is not available where Congress has specifically foreclosed access
to private relief under § 1983.129

Lower federal courts consistently apply a three-part analysis to statutory provisions to determine if they fulfill the former requirement, that
the asserted interest create a right, privilege or immunity within the meaning of § 1983.130 First, Congress must have intended the statute in quesforceable under § 1983"); see also Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir.
1993) (finding that statute imposed binding obligations on states in light of specific regulatory requirements and thus asserted interest was enforceable under
§ 1983). But see Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 865-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(analyzing statute to determine that right created, in conjunction with regulatory
provision, was not enforceable under § 1983); Tony L. ex. rel. Simpson v. Childers,
II, 71 F.3d 1182, 1189 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that federal statute, in conjunction with implementing regulations, did not impose binding obligation on states
and thus did not create enforceable § 1983 right).
126. See Golden St. Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105
(1989) ("As the language of the statute plainly indicates, the remedy encompasses
violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional rights."); Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (holding that § 1983 actions are available to enforce statutory
rights).
127. For a discussion of these limitations, see infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
128. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 423 (1987) (discussing availability of § 1983 remedy); see also Wilder v. Va.
Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (recognizing exceptions to rule that § 1983
provides remedy for statutory violations); Golden St., 493 U.S. at 106-08 (endorsing
presumptive enforceability of statutory rights and articulating exclusions to rule).
129. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (quoting Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984)) (explaining that presumption of enforceable federal right may be rebutted "if Congress 'specifically foreclosed a remedy
under § 1983' . . . [either] expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is
incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983"); Golden St., 493 U.S at
106 (discussing congressional intent to create federal rights); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) ("When the
remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they
may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits
under § 1983.").
130. See Albiston v. Maine, 7 F.3d 258, 264-69 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying factors
to federal grant-in-aid program and concluding that governing statute gave rise to
federal right to prompt disbursement of child-support payments); see also Banks v.
Dallas Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 610-11 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that on basis
of three-part analysis, Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437(0 (e) (1994), did not create enforceable right under § 1983); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d 1322, 1325-27 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding
that Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151-615, gave rise to federal
right after satisfying three-part analysis); Indianapolis Minority Contractors Ass'n,
Inc. v. Wiley, 187 F.3d 743, 750-52 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that rights conferred by
two federal transportation statutes did not satisfy analysis and thus did not create
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tion to confer a benefit on the plaintiff.13 1 Second, the statute must speak
in mandatory terms and thus impose a binding obligation on the states. 1 32
Third, the right must not be so "'vague or amorphous' that its enforce33
ment would strain judicial competence."'
Plaintiffs generally have the least difficulty in meeting the first two
factors.1 3 4 The third factor, however, which requires that the interest be
specific enough to be judicially enforced, sometimes proves more difficult. 135 Nevertheless, a plaintiff who reaches this stage of litigation should
enforceable § 1983 rights). For a discussion of this analysis, see infra notes 131-33
and accompanying text.
131. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (delineating factors to determine whether
particular statutory provision gives rise to federal right); Wright, 479 U.S. at 430
(discussing whether statute and implementing regulation displayed undeniable intent to benefit plaintiffs).
132. See Blessing, 520 U.S at 340-41 (analyzing factors relevant to determining
whether particular statute creates federal right); Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510-11 (considering whether statute imposed binding obligation on states and gave rise to enforceable right); see also Pennhurst St. Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24
(1981) (concluding that statutory provision created pursuant to Congress' spending power was unenforceable because it spoke in terms not intended to be
mandatory). In Halderman, the Court stated,
[t]he legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending
power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts
the terms of the "contract." [A State can not make a] knowing acceptance if [it] is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is
expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on
the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.
Id. at 17.
133. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (articulating analysis); Wright, 479 U.S. at
431-32 (discussing whether benefits conferred upon plaintiffs were within competence of judiciary to enforce).
134. For a discussion of these factors, see supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. One issue that does arise in this area involves proving that a statute imposes a binding obligation on the states when the statutory provision uses an
ambiguous term or terms in its critical language, such as statutes that require a
state to act reasonably to accomplish a stated goal. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S.
347, 363 (1992) (finding that "reasonable efforts" provision did not unambiguously confer enforceable right upon statute's beneficiaries). In Suter, the Court
concluded that "[t]he term 'reasonable efforts' in th[at] context [wa]s at least as
plausibly read to impose only a rather generalized duty on the State." Id.; see also
Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1010-11 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that statute's
provision requiring State Medicaid plan to specify that Medicaid agency would ensure transportation was not specific enough to impose binding obligation on
states). But see Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 718 (lth Cir. 1998) (holding that
statute requiring state Medicaid plan to provide medical assistance with "reasonable promptness" imposed mandatory obligation on states).
135. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 360 (concluding that statute did not confer enforceable right because it provided no guidance regarding how to measure "reasonable
efforts"); see also Harris, 127 F.3d at 1010 n.24 (suggesting that enforcement of
requirement that state practice comply with goals of "simplicity of administration"
and "the best interest of the recipients" might strain judicial competence); Tony L.
ex. rel. Simpson v. Childers, II, 71 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
requirements conferred upon states by Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106A(a) (b) (2) (1988), were not specific enough to create en-
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not have difficulty in proving this factor because a court must already have
established that the regulation in question is specific and definite enough
to be considered a valid administrative interpretation of a federal
13 6
statute.
Once a court determines that the asserted interest creates a federal
right within the meaning of § 1983, a rebuttable presumption of enforceability is created. 137 At this point, the defendant can rebut the prima facie
showing by proving that Congress intended to foreclose recourse to a
§ 1983 remedy.' 3 8 Even if Congress has not explicitly foreclosed a private
remedy in the text of a statute, a court may infer an implicit intent to do so
if "the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive."' 3 9 In other words, the existence of a detailed administrative
remedy may suggest that Congress intended that to be the exclusive remedy and thus has already rejected a § 1983 private cause of action to enforce the asserted right.1 40 Furthermore, a court may decide that the
forceable § 1983 rights); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir.
1995) (concluding that rights created by Older Americans Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3025 (a) (2) (C) (1994), were too amorphous to be enforced by judiciary); Former
Special Project Employees Ass'n v. City of Norfolk, 909 F.2d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 1990)
(finding that rights created by Model Cities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3301 (1977), were too
vague to be judicially enforced). But see Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519-20 (rejecting "too
vague and amorphous" argument and finding that authorizing statute contained
specific guidelines to enforce States' "reasonable and adequate" reimbursement
obligations); Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32 (rejecting "too vague and amorphous" argument and finding regulations defining term "rent" were not beyond competence of judiciary to enforce); Doe, 136 F.3d at 718 (concluding that right to
reasonably prompt provision of assistance under statute was not too vague or amorphous to strain judicial competence).
136. See Harris, 127 F.3d at 1011 n.24 (suggesting that regulations may bring
specific content of statutory rights into realm of judicial enforceability).
137. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 (discussing rebuttable presumption).
138. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984) (stating that dismissal is proper if Congress "specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983")..
139. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (finding that elaborate enforcement provisions of federal pollution control statutes displayed congressional intent to foreclose additional private
remedy); see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994) (asserting that Congress may foreclose § 1983 remedy expressly in words of statute or impliedly by
setting forth comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with private
remedy).
140. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 427-36 (providing categorical approach to
determine when federal statute's comprehensive enforcement scheme should preempt cause of action under § 1983 in absence of clear statement by Congress).
Sunstein suggests that the appropriate test to determine whether a federal statute
is enforceable under § 1983 is to examine whether there is a "manifest inconsistency" between the statute's enforcement scheme and the private remedy, and if
there is, the private right of action should be precluded under § 1983. See id. at
425-26 (discussing preemption of § 1983 through explicit statutory enforcement
scheme). Sunstein provides seven general types of statutory schemes that may present a "manifest inconsistency" with a § 1983 remedy: (1) statutes that create independent private causes of action against state officials; (2) statutes involving openended substantive standards subject to distortion by the judicial branch; (3) stat-
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imposition of a judicial remedy would hinder the effectiveness of the exclusive administrative enforcement scheme.141

B.

Effectiveness of the Section 1983 Remedy

One must question the effectiveness of the Third Circuit's existing
142
As
§ 1983 remedy to redress violations of administrative regulations.
discussed, many plaintiffs resort to § 1983 in this context because either
the authorizing statute does not confer a private cause of action or benot extend to the enforcecause the statute's private right of action does
143
ment of the asserted regulatory interests.
In cases where the statute lacks a private right of action, a federal
court is also likely to reach the same conclusion regarding the existence of
an enforceable § 1983 right. 1 44 Although distinct, the tests are similar in
utes that demand the development and implementation of a consistent and coordinated system of enforcement by an administrative agency; (4) statutes that evince
legislative calibration of sanction to expected enforcement level; (5) statutes containing remedies against federal government to compel state conformity with federal law; (6) statutes utilizing informal methods of enforcement as exclusive route;
and (7) statutes protecting collective interests. See id. at 427-36 (providing examples of "manifest inconsistencies").
141. See PETER W. Low AND JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAw OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1081-82 (1998) (analyzing enforcement of federal statutes in private damage actions brought under § 1983). Low and Jeffries
maintain that if Congress intended for a statute's explicit enforcement mechanism
to be the exclusive remedy, allowing a private right of action would lead to overenforcement of the statute's regulatory standards. See id. at 1082 (discussing
problems raised by private damage actions to enforce grant-in-aid standards). Furthermore, private enforcement may introduce a judicial remedy that invades
agency specialization, impairs an agency's ability to devise consistent enforcement
policies or diminishes the political accountability of those who disburse funds to
the federal programs. See id. (concluding that judicial enforcement of federal statutes under § 1983 may disrupt federal regulatory objectives). The courts have
based many decisions in this area on the concern that a judicially created remedy
may undercut a federal statute's express administrative regulatory scheme. See,

e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alternative mechanism for
enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be especially reluctant ever to
permit a federal court to volunteer its services for enforcement purposes."); Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 461-65 (1974)
(determining that private claims by railroad passengers seeking injunctions against
discontinuance of rail service would undermine Amtrak Act's administrative
procedures).
142. For a further discussion of the effectiveness of the existing § 1983 remedy to redress violations of administrative regulations, see infra notes 143-50 and
accompanying text.
143. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that section
602 of Title VI did not contain private cause of action and that private cause of
action under section 601 of Title VI did not extend to Title VI administrative disparate-impact regulations).
144. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 350 (1992) (finding that section
671 (a) (15) of Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 671 (a) (15), neither conferred privately enforceable right under § 1983 nor itself
contained implied right of action for private enforcement). In so holding, the
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theory-both turn on whether Congress intended to provide a private individual with access to a judicial remedy to redress a violation of the asserted interest. 145 Furthermore, similar to the second exception to the
presumptive enforceability of statutory rights under § 1983, the existence
of a detailed administrative enforcement scheme may also suggest that
Congress did not intend the private enforcement of the statutory interest
146
directly under the statute.
In other instances, a statute may confer a private right of action, but
that right might not extend to the enforcement of certain regulations
promulgated pursuant to it.'

47

In all likelihood, this is because the regula-

14
tions in question attempt to confer rights that the statute does not.'
South Camden, however, illustrates that these regulations are never enforceable under § 1983 because they create interests not implicit in the author149
izing statute.
For these reasons, it is likely that regulatory interests that are not enforceable through a federal statute's private right of action will also be
unenforceable under § 1983.150 If this is so, individuals that suffer violations of these regulations will not have access to a private remedy, but
must instead rely on administrative remedial mechanisms to redress their
injuries. 15 1 Furthermore, in the circumstances where a federal statute

Suter Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to make any type of remedy
available to private persons who sought to enforce the provisions of the Act. See id.
at 364-65 (denying existence of implied cause of action and private remedy). After
examining the statute's enforcement scheme and concluding that Congress sought
to preclude a private remedy under § 1983, the Court stated that "[t]he most important inquiry [in finding an implied cause of action] as well is whether Congress
intended to create the private remedy sought by the plaintiffs." Id. at 364; see also
Middlesex, 453 U.S. at, 20 (concluding that elaborate statutory enforcement provisions evinced congressional intent to foreclose both private § 1983 remedy and
implied fight of action under Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1319, 1342, 1365, 1369 (1994), or Marine Protection, Research, or Sanctuaries
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994)); cf Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 1999)
(deciding that Title VI disparate-impact regulations were enforceable under both
Title VI's implied cause of action and action brought under § 1983).
145. For a further comparison of these analyses, see supra notes 51-52 and
130-33 and accompanying text.
146. See Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 14 (concluding that Congress did not intend to
create fight of action for private citizens suing under statutes in light of elaborate
enforcement provisions).
147. Cf Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285 (holding that disparate-impact regulations
may not be enforced through Title VI's private right of action).
148. Cf id. (finding Title VI regulations that prohibited disparate-impact discrimination unenforceable under statute's private cause of action because Title VI
itself did not protect right to be free from disparate-impact discrimination).
149. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d
771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding Title VI disparate-impact regulations unenforceable under § 1983).
150. For a further discussion of the effectiveness of the § 1983 remedy, see
supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the Title VI administrative remedies, see supra note
25 and accompanying text.
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does contain a private right of action that is available to enforce the asserted regulatory interest, an alternative § 1983 remedy may not even be
52
necessary or desirable to the plaintiff.'

V.

CONCLUSION

The South Camden decision will certainly serve as a final pronouncement in the Third Circuit on the availability of § 1983 claims to redress
state violations of administrative regulations.1 5 3 The decision has undoubtedly foreclosed all suits that assert the right to be free from disparate-impact discrimination in violation of Title VI regulations, in addition
to any other claims that seek to enforce regulatory interests that are not
154
implicit in the provisions of the enforcing federal statutes.
Although those regulations that do constitute valid administrative interpretations under the South Camden formulation, together with their authorizing federal statutes, are presumed to create enforceable § 1983
rights, this presumption is subject to two significant limitations. 155 First,
the asserted interest must constitute a federal right within the meaning of
§ 1983.156 Second, a reviewing court must also ensure that Congress did
not intend to foreclose a private § 1983 remedy for a violation of the asserted interest. 157 Therefore, in only limited circumstances will the South
Camden decision permit plaintiffs in the Third Circuit to enforce rights
conferred by administrative regulations under § 1983.158
The South Camden decision further exemplifies the hesitancy of courts
to imply the existence of federal rights without a clear and unambiguous
mandate from Congress that it intended to create such rights.1 59 Unless a
regulatory interest undoubtedly emanates from an established statutory
right, a plaintiff will not have access to a § 1983 cause of action to vindicate
that right. 160 Furthermore, the regulatory interest, in conjunction with
152. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (discussing whether § 1983 exists as alternative source of relief
in addition to right of action expressly provided under federal statute).
153. For a discussion of the potential implication of the South Camden decision, see supra Part I11.B.
154. For a discussion of the South Camden decision, see supra notes 124-141
and accompanying text.

155. For a discussion of these limitations, see supra Part IV.A.
156. For a further discussion of this limitation, see supra notes 128, 130-36
and accompanying text.
157. For a further discussion of this limitation, see supra notes 129, 137-41
and accompanying text.

158. For a discussion of these circumstances, see infra Parts III.B.2 and V.A.
159. For a further discussion of the concerns surrounding the judicial expansion of rights, see supra Part III.A.
160. For examples of such regulatory interests, see supra Part III.B.2.
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the statutory interest, must evince that Congress intended to comprise a
161
private § 1983 remedy.
Lisa M. Lamb

161. For a discussion of the factors that a court will consider to determine
Congress' intention, see supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
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